The Zune Betrayal, Part Two
First, let us recall the first Zune betrayal.
In 2004, Microsoft launched a logo and testing initiative called PlaysForSure. This was intended to assure customers that PlaysForSure music and video content would work on PlaysForSure devices, and bring order out of the chaos of competing digital rights management schemes and player technologies that befuddled them. Windows Media Player would be the hub, connecting PlaysForSure content with PlaysForSure devices. Hardware and content vendors climbed on board, including BestBuy, Gateway, Napster, Samsung, Linksys, Audiovox, Virgin Electronics, Wal-Mart, Dell and HP.
It took the various vendors a long time to get all the pieces of the puzzle to line up properly. Before the PlaysForSure ecosystem had a decent number of devices and a good supply of content, Apple’s iPod and iTunes had captured seventy percent of the market. A key to Apple’s iPod success was iTunes. Unlike Microsoft’s Media Player that ran only on Windows, free iTunes software ran on Windows and Macintosh computers. Where Microsoft had to count on myriad vendors to all get PlaysForSure right, Apple controlled all the parts of the system, from the iTunes content store to the iPod players, and thus could assure it all worked together seamlessly.
In 2005, Microsoft decided it had to change attacks. Learning the lesson of this marketplace from Apple’s example and PlaysForSure’s difficulties, it cloned the iPod/iTunes model and announced Zune. The Zune device looks like an iPod. Content comes from an online store called Zune Marketplace, like the iTunes store. Zune software running on Windows glues it all together, like the iTunes software. In doing this, Microsoft left its PlaysForSure partners in the lurch.
It appears likely that this kind of partner abandonment will happen again in 2007. Apple has lots of buzz about its impending iPhone, expected to be a heavenly blend of iPod and cell phone (please note, everything Steve Jobs announces for Apple is, by cosmic definition, heavenly). The Microsofties responsible for Zune have also acknowledged that they are planning a Zune phone, as they better be, since they must not cede any advantage to the iPod. This means going into competition with all the PDA and cell phone providers that use Windows CE as the operating system for some or all of their phones. Windows CE has a substantial market presence and is used by most of the major manufacturers. So when Microsoft betrays them by going into direct competition with them, it will be no small thing. Some, like Samsung, will have the honor of being twice spurned. This is a problem Apple does not have.
It will be interesting to see the impact these betrayals have on the willingness of other companies to partner with Microsoft initiatives in the future.
Fooled twice, shame on me.
Copyright © 2006 Philip Bookman
Technorati: Zune, Microsoft
In 2004, Microsoft launched a logo and testing initiative called PlaysForSure. This was intended to assure customers that PlaysForSure music and video content would work on PlaysForSure devices, and bring order out of the chaos of competing digital rights management schemes and player technologies that befuddled them. Windows Media Player would be the hub, connecting PlaysForSure content with PlaysForSure devices. Hardware and content vendors climbed on board, including BestBuy, Gateway, Napster, Samsung, Linksys, Audiovox, Virgin Electronics, Wal-Mart, Dell and HP.
It took the various vendors a long time to get all the pieces of the puzzle to line up properly. Before the PlaysForSure ecosystem had a decent number of devices and a good supply of content, Apple’s iPod and iTunes had captured seventy percent of the market. A key to Apple’s iPod success was iTunes. Unlike Microsoft’s Media Player that ran only on Windows, free iTunes software ran on Windows and Macintosh computers. Where Microsoft had to count on myriad vendors to all get PlaysForSure right, Apple controlled all the parts of the system, from the iTunes content store to the iPod players, and thus could assure it all worked together seamlessly.
In 2005, Microsoft decided it had to change attacks. Learning the lesson of this marketplace from Apple’s example and PlaysForSure’s difficulties, it cloned the iPod/iTunes model and announced Zune. The Zune device looks like an iPod. Content comes from an online store called Zune Marketplace, like the iTunes store. Zune software running on Windows glues it all together, like the iTunes software. In doing this, Microsoft left its PlaysForSure partners in the lurch.
It appears likely that this kind of partner abandonment will happen again in 2007. Apple has lots of buzz about its impending iPhone, expected to be a heavenly blend of iPod and cell phone (please note, everything Steve Jobs announces for Apple is, by cosmic definition, heavenly). The Microsofties responsible for Zune have also acknowledged that they are planning a Zune phone, as they better be, since they must not cede any advantage to the iPod. This means going into competition with all the PDA and cell phone providers that use Windows CE as the operating system for some or all of their phones. Windows CE has a substantial market presence and is used by most of the major manufacturers. So when Microsoft betrays them by going into direct competition with them, it will be no small thing. Some, like Samsung, will have the honor of being twice spurned. This is a problem Apple does not have.
It will be interesting to see the impact these betrayals have on the willingness of other companies to partner with Microsoft initiatives in the future.
Fooled twice, shame on me.
Copyright © 2006 Philip Bookman
Technorati: Zune, Microsoft
Labels: Microsoft, software strategy, Zune
posted by Phil Bookman at 11:05 AM
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